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ROLLING THE DICE: CALCULATING THE ODDS FOR
PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN ARCTIC DRILLING
MICHAEL TODISCO*
I. INTRODUCTION
A man approaches you on the street.  “I have a proposition for
you,” he says. The man opens his two clenched fists and reveals
their contents: in one hand lays a simple, triangular four sided dice,
like you have seen in a dozen board games growing up; in the other
is a crisp one-hundred dollar bill.  Roll a four, he tells you, and you
can have the money and walk away.  Roll a one, a two, or a three,
however, and you’ll have to pay up.
You scratch your head and ask the man the obvious question:
how much will I owe if I do not roll a four?  You start doing some
quick math. For a ten-dollar risk, you are sure to play.  For twenty,
maybe you would gamble.  At forty, fifty, or more, you would walk.
“I have not decided yet,” he says.  How about I tell you the damage
after you roll?
While perhaps a simplified caricature, the above hypothetical
is not dissimilar to the situation that Shell and other actors face in
deciding whether to commence drilling operations in the Arctic.
The possible rewards of an Arctic drilling expedition are temptingly
apparent, but the potential liabilities are clouded and contingent.
Namely, the uncertainty surrounding the prospective award of pu-
nitive damages pursuant to an oil spill could potentially have game-
changing consequences.
Following Shell’s 2012 mishap-laden drilling expedition’s pre-
mature halting due to an unexpected ice floe,1 the Bureau of
Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) was tasked with analyzing the
environmental impact of oil and gas activities associated with Shell’s
Arctic lease.2  The results of the BOEM study were sobering.  Based
* J.D. Candidate, 2016, Stanford University Law School; B.A., 2013, University
of Notre Dame.
1. Simon Bowers, Shell Postpones Plans to Start Arctic Drilling Until Next Year, THE
GUARDIAN (Sept. 17, 2012), available at http://www.theguardian.com/business/
2012/sep/17/shell-postpones-arctic-drilling-next-year.
2. Yereth Rosen, Federal Regulators Issue Chukchi Environmental Review, Possibly a
Step Toward Resuming Drilling, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (Oct. 31, 2014), available at
http://www.adn.com/article/20141031/federal-regulators-issue-chukchi-environ
mental-review-possibly-step-toward-resuming (announcing environmental review
on Chukchi Sea); see generally U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT TO THE SEC’Y OF
(263)
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on scientific studies regarding the unique challenges of drilling in
the Arctic, as well as considerable historical data, BOEM estimates
that over the life of Shell’s lease, an average of two large oil spills
will occur.3  The odds of at least one spill occurring are seventy-five
percent.4  The question then becomes: what will Shell’s liability be
on the three-fourths chance that a spill will occur?  Because of two
critical authority splits regarding the viability of punitive damages
in maritime law, this question remains largely undecided.5
Punitive damages can dramatically alter an actor’s liability in
the event of an oil spill.  Consider Exxon’s liability after the Exxon
Valdez disaster.6  The company spent $2.1 billion in cleanup efforts,
settled a civil action with the United States and Alaska for $900 mil-
lion, pleaded guilty to criminal violations requiring fines, paid $303
million in voluntary damages to private parties, and stipulated to its
own negligence in a final civil suit with private parties for another
$507.5 million in compensatory damages.7  Despite having already
been punished to the tune of more than $4 billion, a jury found
Shell responsible for another $5 billion in punitive damages.8  The
award for punitive damages, however, was lowered on Due Process
grounds by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,9 and then again by
the Supreme Court.10
THE INTERIOR: REVIEW OF SHELL’S 2012 ALASKA OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS EXPLORA-
TION PROGRAM (Mar. 8, 2013), available at http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases
/upload/Shell-report-3-8-13-Final.pdf (outlining potential impact of offshore
extraction).
3. BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., ALASKA OCS REGION, CHUKCHI SEA PLAN-
NING AREA: DRAFT SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, 153
(Oct. 2014), available at http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/About_BO
EM/BOEM_Regions/Alaska_Region/Leasing_and_Plans/Leasing/Lease_Sales/
Sale_193/Lease_Sale_193_DraftSSEIS_vol1.pdf (outlining proposed action).
4. Id. at 153-54 (discussing relative odds of oil spills over course of drilling).
5. See Collin Eaton, Supreme Court Could Settle Punitive Damage Question in BP
Case, THE HOUS. CHRONICLE (Sept. 5, 2014), available at http://www.houstonchron
icle.com/business/energy/article/Supreme-Court-could-settle-punitive-damage-57
37308.php (outlining reasons Supreme Court may hear suit).
6. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008) (holding lower court
properly vacated punitive damages).
7. Id. at 471 (describing company’s restitution efforts).
8. Id. (holding Shell was responsible for compensatory damages in addition to
voluntary damages).
9. In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1246-47 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding five
billion dollar award excessive and lowering award to $4 billion dollars).
10. Baker, 554 U.S. at 514 (lowering award to five hundred seven million five
hundred thousand dollars, matching total compensatory damages).
2
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While the rules for punitive damage liability are largely settled
in most areas of law,11 an action against Shell for Arctic drilling
would be heard under less-clear maritime law.12  Maritime (or ad-
miralty) law is a distinct body of both substantive and procedural
law that is heard in the federal courts of the United States.13  Fol-
lowing a tradition of admiralty law in British courts,14 the founders
codified the existence of a separate body of maritime law in Article
III of the Constitution,15 with the hope of creating a uniform body
of law on the high seas to facilitate national commerce.16  As such,
the universe of case law that governs maritime oil spill claims is en-
tirely distinct (and substantially less developed) than a similar claim
on land.  Several circuit splits have developed in maritime law, par-
ticularly given the Supreme Court’s limited opportunities to weigh
in on certain maritime issues.17
Two important splits regarding maritime punitive damages,
each with profound importance for setting the total liability result-
ing from an at-sea oil spill, have recently come to the forefront.
First, federal courts disagree whether the Oil Pollution Act (OPA)18
allows for punitive damages, or if Congress intended for that statute
to preempt punitive damages and act as an exhaustive recovery re-
gime.19  Second, federal circuit courts are in disagreement over the
11. The same cannot be said, however, for the amounts of punitive damages
awards, which remains hotly contested. See, e.g., Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and
Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (Nov. 1982) (discussing
history of punitive damages generally).
12. See, e.g. Baker, 554 U.S. at 475 (hearing oil-spill liabilities case under mari-
time law).
13. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining “general maritime
law”).  “General maritime law is a branch of federal common law.  It is distin-
guished from statutory law.” Id.
14. Admiralty: An Overview, CORNELL LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.law.cor
nell.edu/wex/admiralty (last visited Jan. 26, 2015) (discussing sources and history
of admiralty law).
15. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.  “The judicial power [of Federal Courts] shall
extend . . . to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.” Id.
16. Admiralty: An Overview, supra note 14.
17. Cf. In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex-
ico (In re Deepwater Horizon), 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 960 (E.D. La. 2011) (holding
parties’ claims were displaced by Oil Production Act of 1990, which required suits
to comply with act’s procedures).  “Only a handful of courts have had the opportu-
nity to address [the question of punitive damages in maritime].” Id.
18. Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA), 33 U.S.C. § 2701 (2012).
19. Compare South Port Marine v. Gulf Oil, 234 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2000) (hold-
ing OPA preempts availability of punitive damages in oil-spill controversies), with
In re Deepwater Horizon (rejecting First Circuit’s holding and finding punitive dam-
ages are not preempted).
3
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proper standard for vicarious punitive liability in maritime law.20  In
other words, the courts disagree under which circumstances an em-
ployer should be liable for punitive damages attributable to the acts
of its employee.
It is a particularly important time to address these splits of au-
thority.  After the British Petroleum (BP) oil spill in the Gulf of
Mexico, it is highly likely that the Supreme Court will address both
these splits of authority on appeal from the Fifth Circuit.21  Profes-
sor Blaine LeCesne, an expert on the BP oil spill, said that punitive
damages remain the biggest question mark in resolving BP’s liabili-
ties.22  Were the question of punitive damages appealed, “the Su-
preme Court would have almost no choice but to rule on it.”23
Given the “huge financial implications” and “enormous public im-
portance” of the question, LeCesne argues it “would be inconceiv-
able of them not to.”24
This paper will address both splits in authority and attempt to
forecast the Supreme Court’s rulings based on both legal and nor-
mative arguments.  Part I will address the issue of possible OPA pre-
emption.  Part II will address the question of punitive vicarious
liability.
II. STATUTORY PREEMPTION
Before having the opportunity to address the extent of vicari-
ous punitive damages available in maritime law, a court may find
the award of punitive damages is preempted by the compensation
scheme created by Congress in the OPA.25  With the Supreme
Court yet to rule on the question, only a handful of courts have had
the opportunity to address the issue: the First Circuit has held that
the OPA is an exhaustive remedy scheme,26 while the Eastern Dis-
20. Compare Matter of P&E Boat Rentals, Inc., 872 F.2d 642, 650-51 (5th Cir.
1989) (finding Supreme Court precedent sets proper standard for punitive dam-
ages), with CEH, INC. v. F/V Seafarer, 70 F.3d 694, 705 (1st Cir. 1995) (eschewing
Supreme Court precedent and finding Second Restatement of Torts provides cor-
rect standard for punitive damages).
21. Eaton, supra note 5 (outlining reasons Supreme Court may hear suit relat-
ing to punitive damages).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., South Port Marine v. Gulf Oil, 234 F.3d 58, 64-66 (1st Cir. 2000)
(holding OPA of 1990 policies preempt punitive damages in oil-spill suits).
26. Id. (holding OPA preempts punitive damages).
4
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trict of Louisiana maintains punitive damages and OPA penalties
are concurrently available.27
A. First Circuit
In South Port Marine v. Gulf Oil, the First Circuit looked to both
historic and contemporary maritime law to determine that punitive
damages are not available to plaintiffs under the OPA.28
In February of 1997, a Gulf Oil employee left a tanker unat-
tended during the refueling process, leading nearly 30,000 gallons
of gasoline to spill into the harbor.29  A majority of the spill entered
the cove belonging to South Port and caused serious damage to
their docks, equipment, and electrical posts.30  South Port asserted
various claims under both the federal OPA and state common law
(including negligence, private nuisance, and trespass).31  The court
found that South Port did not have a legal basis for punitive dam-
ages under any of its state common law actions, and therefore as-
sessed the viability of punitive damages under the OPA.32
The court noted that Section 2702 of the OPA sets forth a list
of six damages available under the OPA and “[a]bsent from that list
of recoverable damages is any mention of punitive damages.”33  By
negative implication, then, “Congress intended the enactment of
the OPA to supplant the existing general admiralty and maritime
law, which allowed certain circumstances in the area of oil
pollution.”34
The First Circuit based its reasoning largely on the Supreme
Court decision of Miles v. Apex Marine.35  In Miles, the court rejected
the plaintiff’s claim for loss of society damages in addition to statu-
tory damages delineated in the Death on the High Seas Act
(DOHSA).36  In the oft-quoted language from Miles, the court
stated: “in an area covered by statute, it would be no more appro-
27. In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico,
808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 960-62 (E.D. La. 2011) (stating nothing in OPA will be frus-
trated by allowing punitive damages as traditionally sought in maritime law).
28. South Port Maine, 234 F.3d at 64-66 (stating definitively OPA does not pro-
vide for punitive damages).
29. Id. at 61 (describing spill of Boston Towing tank barge).
30. Id. (describing damages caused by Boston Towing spill).
31. Id. (listing claims brought under federal OPA and state common law).
32. Id. (reiterating court holding regarding viability of claims).
33. South Port Maine, 234 F.3d at 64 (quoting damages available under federal
OPA).
34. Id. at 65 (quoting exceptional circumstances for oil pollution claims).
35. 498 U.S. 19, 19 (1990) (citing precedent used).
36. Id. at 28-29 (explaining Miles outcome regarding damages).
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priate to prescribe a different measure of damage than to prescribe
a different statute of limitations, or a different class of benefi-
ciaries.”37  Because the South Port court found a significant overlap
between the substance and purpose of OPA liability and any addi-
tional punitive damages liability, it deferred to congressional judg-
ment and found punitive damages statutorily barred.38
B. Eastern District of Louisiana
On April 20, 2010, an explosion on the mobile offshore drill-
ing rig, Deepwater Horizon, caused a blowout on the well.39  After
three months of uncontrollable oil release, British Petroleum, the
lessee and principal operator of the rig, announced the hemorrhag-
ing well had been capped—but not before 4.9 million barrels of
crude oil had spilled into the gulf.40
Litigation pursuant to the oil spill has been prolific and high
profile.41  The possible award of punitive damages is perhaps the
biggest unknown factor leading up to an appeal to the Supreme
Court.42  The district court disagreed with the decision in South
Port,43 citing two post-South Port and Miles Supreme Court cases to
justify its departure.44  Applying those two decisions, the Eastern
District found that the “OPA does not displace general maritime
law claims for those Plaintiffs who would have been able to bring
such claims prior to the OPA’s enactment.”45
37. Id. at 31 (quoting court dismissal of prescribing damages).
38. South Port Maine, 234 F.3d at 66 (describing court reasoning regarding
punitive damage liability).
39. See, e.g., Mika Gro¨nahl et al., Investigating the Cause of the Deepwater Horizon
Blowout, NEW YORK TIMES (June 21, 2010), available at http://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2010/06/21/us/20100621-bop.html (providing description of off-
shore drilling explosion).
40. Joel Achenbach & David A. Fahrenthold, Oil Spill Dumped 4.9 Million Bar-
rels Into Gulf of Mexico, WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2010), available at http://www.washing
tonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/02/AR2010080204695.html (giv-
ing specific data about oil spill).
41. Id. (providing example of extensive media coverage).
42. Eaton, supra note 5 (quoting LeCesne: “[Punitive damages liability] is the
biggest unknown left in terms of BP’s remaining liability”).
43. In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico,
808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 960-62 (E.D. La. 2011)  (generally disagreeing with rea-
soning).
44. Id. at 960 (citing Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008) and
Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404 (2009)).
45. Id. at 963 (establishing new law regarding OPA maritime claims).
6
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C. Resolution: The OPA Does Not Preclude Punitive Damages
While the OPA catalogues a fairly thorough recovery regime
for oil-spill plaintiffs, the statute is silent on the issue of punitive
damages46—leaving both the South Port and the Deepwater Horizon
interpretations well within the bounds of reason when applying the
bare canons of statutory analysis.  However, as referenced above,
the Supreme Court has issued two decisions since the First Circuit
decided South Port all but foreclosing the possibility the OPA should
be interpreted to preclude, sub silentio, the recovery of punitive
damages47
1. The Shortcomings of Miles
Before turning to the more recent Supreme Court decisions, it
is worth briefly reviewing Miles v. Apex Marine,48 the case upon
which the First Circuit principally relied in South Port and treated as
dispositive on the issue.49  The Miles decision is particularly weak
authority to resolve the question of punitive damages in maritime
law, and recent courts have been wise to look to other sources.
First, Miles does not actually address punitive damages: the
question before the Court was the availability of loss-of-society dam-
ages in a wrongful death suit, and punitive damages were only men-
tioned in the opinion with reference to the lower court’s decision
to deny such damages on the specific facts of the case.50  Thus, in
order to reach its decision in South Port, the First Circuit broadened
Miles into a much more general and expansive framework than the
Supreme Court intended.
Second, the reasoning in Miles was poor.  The Miles court de-
clined to extend damages beyond those enumerated in DOHSA be-
cause the death of a seaman was an “area covered by statute.”51 But
Congress had never actually said to deprive DOHSA claimants of
their common law recourse to loss-of-society damages.52  Rather,
the Court followed an attenuated string of inferences to arrive at its
46. 33 U.S.C. § 2701 (2012) (lacking language regarding punitive damages
for oil spill plaintiffs).
47. Id. (interpreting statute silence as punitive damage preclusion).
48. See generally 498 U.S. 19, 19 (1990) (establishing cornerstone for punitive
damage recovery).
49. 234 F.3d 58, 65-66 (1st Cir. 2000) “This question has largely been decided
for us by the Supreme Court in Miles v. Apex Marine.” Id.
50. Miles, 498 U.S. at 22-23 (denying effectiveness of Miles precedent for puni-
tive damage issue).
51. Id. at 31 (highlighting limiting language of statute).
52. David W. Robertson, Punitive Damages in American Maritime Law, 28 J. MAR.
L. & COM. 73, 143 (Jan. 1997) (lacking Congressional authority to deny recovery).
7
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result.  First, DOHSA incorporated by reference the Federal Em-
ployer’s Liability Act (FELA), which fails to address damages.53
Next, the Supreme Court had interpreted FELA to preclude loss-of-
society damages in Michigan Central Railroad v. Vreeland54 in 1913.55
In turn, the Miles court concluded:
[w]hen  Congress passed [DOHSA], the Vreeland gloss on
FELA, and the hoary tradition behind it, were well estab-
lished. Incorporating FELA unaltered into the Jones Act,
Congress must have intended to incorporate the pecuni-
ary limitation on damages as well. We assume that Con-
gress is aware of existing law when it passes legislation.56
Thus, Miles is based on the premise that when Congress passes
a law, it is aware not only of all provisions of related incorporated
statutes, but any common law gloss that has been subsequently
added.
Remember where this inquiry started: does the OPA preclude
the recovery of punitive damages?  Consider the nesting dolls that
the South Port court had to open, one after another, to arrive at
their result: Miles was hidden in the OPA, DOHSA was tucked
within Miles, FELA was concealed in DOHSA, and Vreeland was se-
creted away inside FELA.  Is Vreeland, a 1913 case deciding the com-
pensation to the family of a deceased railway worker, the ultimate
authority that denies punitive damages for oil spills?  This result
strains credulity.
2. Dispensing with South Port: The Baker-Townsend One-Two
Punch
As exemplified by South Port, the Miles framework had metasta-
sized into a tradition that had all but extinguished punitive dam-
ages in maritime law.57 Exxon v. Baker, the 2008 Supreme Court
53. Id. at 142 (applying inappropriate act to issue).
54. See generally 227 U.S. 59 (1913) (analyzing FELA).
55. Id. at 69-71 (interpreting FELA to preclude loss-of-society damages).
56. Miles, 498 U.S. at 32 (quoting rule on pecuniary damages).
57. As the Miles framework gained momentum, a wide-range of courts used it
to justify the denial of punitive damages. See, e.g., Clausen v. M/V New Carissa, 339
F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2003); Guevara v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 59 F.3d 1496, 1510
(5th Cir. 1995); Glynn v. Roya Al Boat Mgmt. Corp., 57 F.3d 1495, 1503 (9th Cir.
1995); Horsley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 15 F.3d 200, 202 (1st Cir. 1994); Miller v. Ameri-
can President Lines, Ltd., 989 F.2d 1450 (6th Cir. 1993); see also Brittan J. Bush, The
Answer Lies in Admiralty: Justifying Oil Spill Punitive Damages Recovery Through Admi-
ralty Law, 41 ENVTL. L. 1255, 1269 (Fall 2011) “Scholars proclaimed, in light of
Miles’s expansion, that maritime punitive damages were on the brink of death.” Id.
8
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case arising from the Exxon Valdez oil spill, broke the trend and
reaffirmed the viability of punitive damages in admiralty.58  The
Court in Baker addressed whether punitive damages were pre-
empted by the Clean Water Act (CWA),59 the federal statute gov-
erning oil-spill liabilities before the OPA was passed in 1990.60  The
Court found there was “no clear indication of congressional intent
to occupy the entire field of pollution remedies,”61 and “[i]n order
to abrogate a common-law principle, [the viability of punitive dam-
ages], the statute must speak directly to the question addressed by the
common law.”62
The following year in Atlantic Sounding Co., Inc. v. Townsend,63
the Court revisited its decision in Miles under a narrower scope.64
Townsend involved a suit in admiralty for maintenance and cure
where the Supreme Court upheld the punitive damages award.65
The Court distinguished Miles, because the underlying claim
(wrongful death on the high seas), was only available because of
statute, and “there was no general common-law doctrine providing
for such an action.”66  Thus, Townsend clarified that Miles did not
stand for the proposition that punitive damages were unavailable
where a statute created an underlying claim; rather, it provided pu-
nitive damages were only unavailable where the underlying claim
existed solely because of statute.  As maintenance and cure claims
developed under common law long before the passage of DOHSA,
the statute was not the exclusive basis for remedies.67
58. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 484-89 (2008).
59. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2012).  Congress passed the OPA in response to the
Exxon Valdez disaster; however, because the statute did not apply retroactively, the
CWA still governed all claims against Exxon in Baker.
60. Baker, 554 U.S. at 484 (questioning CWA preemption).
61. Id. at 488-89.  Strangely, the Court failed to address Miles and its progeny
in its sparse, two-paragraph explanation, where it dismissed the merits of the pre-
emption argument.
62. Id. at 489 (quoting United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993)) (em-
phasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
63. Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 407 (2009).
64. Id. at 407, 418-24 (providing Supreme Court discussion of Miles in Town-
send).  “Miles does not require [the Court] to eliminate the general maritime rem-
edy of punitive damages for the willful or wanton failure to comply with the duty to
pay maintenance and cure.” Id. at 422.  “The fact that seamen commonly seek to
recover under the Jones Act for maintenance and cure claims, does not mean that
the Jones Act provides the only remedy.” Id.
65. Id. at 417-26.  Maintenance and cure is a claim in admiralty that provides
injured seamen with day-to-day living expenses (maintenance) and medical costs
(cure).  Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 528 (1938).
66. Townsend, 577 U.S. at 419-22.
67. Id. at 414, 422.
9
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Baker and Townsend both squarely support the Eastern District
of Louisiana’s proposition that the OPA does not preempt punitive
damages as a remedy.68 Baker, on its own, may seem dispositive on
the question through a simple syllogism: the Court found that the
CWA did not preempt punitive damages, the OPA is the successor
to the CWA, and thus the OPA should not preempt punitive dam-
ages.  As tempting as it may be to rely on such reasoning, Baker re-
quires more than a facial substantive connection, and calls for fairly
thorough statutory analysis.69  In other words, Baker did not say the
CWA allows for punitive damages because punitive damages are in-
trinsically available in all oil spill claims, but because the text of
CWA does not preclude remedies it does not list.70
Baker included two discrete prongs: Does the OPA directly ab-
rogate the common law principle of punitive damages, and did
Congress, through the OPA, intend to occupy the entire field of
remedies?71  To the first prong, the answer is clearly “no.”  The
OPA makes no mention of punitive damages, and thus falls short of
the Court’s requirement that a statute “must speak directly to the
question” to dispose of a common law remedy.72  In contrast to
South Port, the Court in Baker makes a fairly clear assertion that stat-
utory silence on the question of punitive damages likely allows for
them.73
The second prong also results in a fairly definitive “no.”  The
OPA contains two clauses that explicitly preserve a plaintiff’s rights
to recover beyond the OPA.  First, the OPA allows for plaintiffs to
concurrently recover under any state oil-spill-liability statutory
68. See generally Townsend, 577 U.S. at 407; Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554
U.S. 471, 476 (2008); see also In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in
the Gulf of Mexico, 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 960-62 (E.D. La. 2011); Bush, supra note
55, at 1258; Ronen Perry, The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and the Limits of Civil Liabil-
ity, 86 WASH. L. REV. 1, 1 (2011).
69. See Baker, 554 U.S. at 489 (declining to assume Congressional intent with
respect to all pollution remedies).
70. See id. at 488-90 (noting lack of CWA language regarding punitive or other
categories of damages does not preempt those damages in actions arising under
CWA).
71. Id. (providing Baker analysis of damages available under CWA).
72. See Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2718, 2751 (2012) (making no
mention of punitive damages); see also Baker, 554 U.S. at 489. (quoting United
States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
73. Baker, 554 U.S. at 488-89.  “[W]e find it too hard to conclude that a statute
expressly geared to protecting ‘water,’ ‘shorelines,’ and ‘natural resources’ was in-
tended to eliminate sub silentio oil companies’ common law duties. Id.
10
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scheme.74  Second, the OPA has a savings clause, which states the
OPA does not affect “civil actions under admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which
they are otherwise entitled.”75  These two clauses serve as plain evi-
dence that Congress never intended the OPA to be exhaustive.76
Townsend further solidifies the availability of punitive damages.
Most importantly, Townsend substantially pared back misinterpreta-
tions of Miles, limiting its application to claims that arise solely from
federal statute and had no prior common-law tradition.77  The
question thus becomes: were punitive damages available in contam-
ination and maritime suits before the passage of the OPA? Town-
send clearly affirms “the common-law tradition of punitive damages
extends to maritime claims,” and several cases support the proposi-
tion that punitive damages have long been available in contamina-
tion suits.78
While South Port ostensibly remains good law, the decision re-
ceives distinct skepticism in the Deepwater Horizon ruling, which
stands in direct contradiction.  It seems evident in light of Baker and
Townsend, if the issue reached the Supreme Court, the Eastern Dis-
trict of Louisiana’s interpretation falls in line with the Supreme
Court’s logic, and the reasoning in favor of punitive damages under
the OPA would carry the day.
III. VICARIOUS PUNITIVE LIABILITY
Although no one should interpret the OPA as preempting the
recovery of punitive damages, further disagreement arises between
lower courts over which actions should trigger the award of punitive
damages.79  Though many courts have broadly held punitive dam-
ages as recoverable under general maritime law for a variety of ac-
tions,80 courts sharply divide over extending punitive damages to an
74. 33 U.S.C. § 2718(a)(1) (2012) “Nothing in this Act . . . shall affect, or be
construed or interpreted as preempting, the authority of any State or political sub-
division thereof from imposing any additional liability.” Id.
75. 33 U.S.C. § 2751(e)(2) (2012).
76. Congress knows how to preempt punitive damages in clear terms when it
so intends. See, e.g., 46 U.S.C. § 30307(b) (2012) (explicitly preempting punitive
damages in commercial aviation accidents).
77. See Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 420-24 (2009).
78. Id. at 414 (2009). See also, e.g., Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S 238,
238 (1984).
79. For discussion on the existence of punitive damages under the OPA, see
Part I, supra notes 25-78, and accompanying text.
80. See, e.g., Muratore v. M/S Scotia Prince, Etc., 845 F.2d 347, 354 (1st Cir.
1988) (awarding punitive damages in maritime for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress); In re Marine Sulphur Queen, 460 F.2d 89, 105 (2d Cir. 1972)
11
Todisco: Rolling the Dice: Calculating the Odds for Punitive Damages in Ar
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2015
274 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVI: p. 263
employer for the acts of an employee under the theory of respondeat
superior.81
A. Early Rulings
The Supreme Court first addressed the question of vicarious
liability for punitive damages in admiralty in The Amiable Nancy.82
In the case, sailors aboard the (aptly-named) Scourge illegally
boarded and subsequently plundered The Amiable Nancy under di-
rection of the Scourge’s captain and first lieutenant.83  Various par-
ties from The Amiable Nancy brought suit against the owner of the
Scourge and received compensatory damages for personal injuries
and loss of property.84  The Court, however, declined to extend the
liability of the ship-owners any further:
[I]f this were a suit against the original wrong-doers, it
might be proper to go yet farther, and visit upon them in
the shape of exemplary [punitive] damages, the proper
punishment which belongs to such lawless misconduct.
But it is to be considered, that this is a suit against the
owners of the privateer, upon whom the law has, from mo-
tives of policy, devolved a responsibility for the conduct of
the officers and crew employed by them, and yet, from the
nature of the service, they can scarcely ever be able to secure
to themselves an adequate indemnity in cases of loss.
They are innocent of the demerit of this transaction, hav-
ing neither directed it, nor countenanced it, nor partici-
pated in it in the slightest degree.  Under such
circumstances, we are of opinion that they are bound to
repair all the real injuries and personal wrongs sustained
by the libellants, but they are not bound to the extent of
vindictive [punitive] damages.85
(awarding punitive damages in maritime for wrongful death); The Seven Brothers,
170 F. 126, 127 (D.R.I. 1909) (awarding punitive damages in maritime for property
damage).
81. Compare In re P&E Boat Rentals, Inc., 872 F.2d 642 (5th Cir. 1989) (hold-
ing that Supreme Court precedent sets proper standard for punitive damages),
with CEH, Inc. v. F/V Seafarer, (ON 675048), 70 F.3d 694 (1st Cir. 1995) (rejecting
Supreme Court precedent and finding Second Restatement of Torts provides cor-
rect standard for punitive damages).
82. The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 546 (1818).
83. Id. at 550.
84. Id. at 553.
85. Id. at 558-59 (emphasis in original).
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Thus, The Amiable Nancy stands for the proposition that while vicari-
ous liability extends to the employer for any losses actually sus-
tained by the plaintiffs, the availability of punitive damages requires
the employer directs, supports, or participates in the tortious acts of
the employee.
The Supreme Court affirmed the holding of The Amiable Nancy
decades later in the non-admiralty case of Lake Shore,86  wherein a
passenger sued a railway for the tortious acts of one of the railway’s
conductors.87  Citing to The Amiable Nancy, Justice Gray noted that:
Exemplary or punitive damages, being awarded, not by
way of compensation to the sufferer, but by way of punish-
ment of the offender, and as a warning to others, can only
be awarded against one who has participated in the of-
fense. A principal, therefore, though of course liable to
make compensation for injuries done by his agent within
the scope of his employment, cannot be held liable for
exemplary or punitive damages, merely by reason of wan-
ton, oppressive, or malicious intent on the part of the
agent.88
Although not an admiralty case, Lake Shore nonetheless influ-
enced the construction of early rules for vicarious punitive damages
in admiralty law.89 The Amiable Nancy’s fault-based rule for punitive
damages arguably qualifies as mere dicta because the case did not
actually involve an issue of punitive damages.90  The Lake Shore
Court, however, interpreted The Amiable Nancy as constituting a rule
in the courts of admiralty.91
B. Examining the Circuit Split
Despite early Supreme Court rulings on the issue, four circuit
courts sitting in admiralty split evenly on the question of vicarious
punitive damages: In cases of first impression, the Fifth and Sixth
86. Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101, 107-08 (1893)
(affirming The Amiable Nancy decision).
87. Id. at 102-03 (describing facts of case).
88. Id. at 107 (applying The Amiable Nancy decision regarding exemplary and
punitive damages).
89. See, e.g., infra notes 93-123 and accompanying text (discussing circuit split
regarding application of Lake Shore to punitive damages).
90. See The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 546, 552-56  (1818) (address-
ing damages at issue).
91. See Lake Shore, 147 U.S. at 109 (noting rule not solely applicable to admi-
ralty case).  “The rule thus laid down is not peculiar to courts of admiralty . . . .” Id.
13
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Circuits adopted The Amiable Nancy/Lake Shore standard, while the
First and Ninth Circuits opted for a more lenient standard.92
1. Sixth Circuit
In U.S. Steel v. Fuhrman, the Sixth Circuit became the first fed-
eral appellate court to interpret The Amiable Nancy and Lake Shore.93
At trial, the district court found U.S. Steel liable for punitive dam-
ages for the acts of its employee in ordering a steamship to proceed
at full speed across a river despite heavy fog and limited visibility,
leading to a deadly collision with another ship.94  The district court
awarded punitive damages against U.S. Steel in large part because
the corporation failed to countermand the captain’s order.95  The
Sixth Circuit determined, however, that “the isolated action of [a
single ship captain] does not support a finding that United States
Steel knew of this deviation, much less ordered it.”96  In assessing
the district court’s holding, the Sixth Circuit stated, “punitive dam-
ages are not recoverable against the owner of a vessel for the act of
the master unless it can be shown that the owner authorized or rati-
fied the acts of the master either before or after the accident.”97
Because U.S. Steel neither authorized nor ratified the actions of the
employee in ordering the steamship to continue in the fog, the
Sixth Circuit court found the district court’s award of punitive dam-
ages erroneous.98
2. Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit first addressed the issue in Matter of P&E Boat
Rentals, Inc., when the company-owner of a boat was sued for the
92. Compare Matter of P&E Boat Rentals, Inc., 872 F.2d 642, 651-52 (5th Circ.
1989) (adopting rule from The Amiable Nancy/Lake Shore), and U.S. Steel Corp. v.
Fuhrman, 407 F.2d 1143, 1148 (6th Cir. 1969) (applying punitive damages rule
from The Amiable Nancy/Lake Shore), with CEH, Inc. v. F/V Seafarer, 70 F.3d 694,
705 (1st Cir. 1995) (imposing vicarious liability standard from RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 909), and Prospectus Alpha Navigation Co. v. North Pac. Grain
Growers, 767 F.2d 1379, 1386-87 (9th Cir. 1985) (rejecting Lake Shore standard).
93. See Fuhrman, 407 F.2d at 1143, 1148 (interpreting The Amiable Nancy/Lake
Shore 6th Cir. 1969).
94. Id. at 1147-48 (finding facts did not support imposition of punitive dam-
ages).
95. Id. at 1145-46 (applying clearly erroneous standard to district court find-
ing).
96. Id. at 1146 (finding insufficient evidence to support managerial discretion
approach).
97. Id. at 1148 (discussing applicability of punitive damages).
98. Fuhrman, 407 F.2d at 1148 (summarizing Sixth Circuit finding).
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acts of its employee.99  The facts of the case are quite similar to
Fuhrman: two employees unilaterally piloted a ship across a fog-
laden terrain, leading to a tragic and fatal collision.100  Citing Fuhr-
man, the Fifth Circuit held that “punitive damages may not be im-
posed against a corporation when one or more of its employees
decides on his own to engage in malicious or outrageous con-
duct.”101  Because there was no evidence that the specific decision
to pilot the ships through the fog was approved by P&E manage-
ment, or that P&E policymaking officials were aware of the practice
of operating ships in heavy fog, the company was not liable for pu-
nitive damages.102
The court defended the Fuhrman rule as being more consistent
with the overall goals of punitive damages than a rule that held
employers strictly liable for the acts of their employees.103  The
court argued the proper reason for awarding punitive damages was
to punish the offending party and deter others from taking such
actions in the future.104  When the corporation is found to have
taken no part in the wrongdoing, punitive damages would not serve
this purpose, but merely increase the amount of damages.105
3. Ninth Circuit
In Prospectus Alpha Navigation Co. v. North Pacific Grain Growers,
the Ninth Circuit declined to follow the path of its sister courts.106
Recognizing a split in authority on the issue of vicarious punitive
damages, the Ninth Circuit adopted the Second Restatement of
Torts standard, which states that vicarious punitive damages are ap-
propriate where: 1) the principal authorized the agent to commit
the act; 2) the principal recklessly employed or retained an unfit
agent; 3) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and act-
ing in the scope of employment; or 4) the principal or managerial
agent later approved the act in question.107
99. Matter of P&E Boat Rentals, Inc., 872 F.2d 642, 645 (5th Cir. 1989)
(describing P&E Boat Rentals).
100. Id. at 644-45 (providing facts of P&E Boat Rentals).
101. Id. at 652.
102. Id. at 652-53.
103. Id. at 652 (providing reasoning of Fifth Circuit).
104. P&E Boat Rentals, 872 F.2d at 652 (finding purpose of punitive damages
undercut by imposing liability on P&E).
105. Id. (underscoring proper purpose of punitive damages).
106. Prospectus Alpha Navigation Co. v. North Pac. Grain Growers, 767 F.2d
1379, 1386 (9th Cir. 1985).
107. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909).
15
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The Ninth Circuit explained that the Restatement standard
mirrored the standard in Lake Shore with one difference: the Re-
statement imposes liability pursuant to a third prong, which allows
for punitive damages where the tortious act was committed by an
agent acting in a managerial capacity within the scope of employ-
ment, irrespective of the fault of the employer.108  The court found
the Restatement standard “better reflects the reality of modern cor-
porate America . . . [because] a corporation can act only through
its agents and employees, and [ ] no reasonable distinction can be
made between the guilt of the employee in a managerial capacity
acting within the scope of his employment and the guilt of the
corporation.”109
The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s award of punitive
damages because the company’s dock foreman—an employee that
the court deemed a manager because he performed a supervisory
role and managed several employees—committed the tortious
act.110 The court, however, left open whether vicarious punitive lia-
bility would extend to acts of menial employees, declining to ad-
dress that issue because it was not necessary to resolve the case at
bar.111
4. First Circuit
Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit in Prospectus Alpha did not once
address the looming precedent of The Amiable Nancy, seemingly the
touchstone for punitive-damages adjudication in maritime law.  In
CEH, INC. v. F/V Seafarer, the First Circuit adopted the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s Restatement standard, but in doing so met The Amiable
Nancy’s conflicting standard head on.112  The court stated, “we do
not believe the early nineteenth century decision in The Amiable
Nancy and the late nineteenth, nonadmiralty decision in Lake Shore
dictate the result here.”113  In rejecting those two precedential
cases, the First Circuit argued, “[n]either [The Amiable Nancy nor
Lake Shore] considered the more modern concerns reflected in the
contrary case law . . . .”114
108. Id. (underscoring additional liability imposed under Restatement).
109. Id.
110. Prospectus Alpha, 767 F.2d at 1387.
111. Id.
112. CEH, Inc. v. F/V Seafarer, 70 F.3d 694, 704 (1st Cir. 1995) (illustrating
conflict between Ninth Circuit Restatement and The Amiable Nancy standard).
113. Id. (quoting court language regarding conflicting standards).
114. Id. (lamenting failure of both cases to address modern concerns).
16
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Instead, the First Circuit applied a newly adopted rule and
held that punitive damages stemmed from defendant-employer’s
conduct because an agent in a managerial capacity committed the
act.115  The employee in question acted as a ship’s mate with the
authority to hire and fire crew, determine the location and dura-
tion of the fishing expeditions, and sell the catch at his discre-
tion.116  Justifying the decision, the First Circuit explained that the
imposition of punitive damages “encourages shipowners to hire
qualified and responsible captains and to exercise supervisory
power over them.”117  Like the Ninth Circuit, the First Circuit left
the question open as to how far “managerial capacity” could extend
and whether mere menial employees might incur liability for com-
pany or owner through their decision-making.118
C. Recent Supreme Court Litigation
In perhaps the most visible environmental trial of the 20th cen-
tury, Exxon v. Baker, the Supreme Court received the opportunity to
resolve the circuit split over the standard for vicarious punitive
damages in maritime law.119 Baker arose out of the 1989 Exxon
Valdez oil spill in Prince William Sound, in which the court held
Exxon as acting negligent for employing Captain Joseph Hazel-
wood, a known alcoholic.120  Immediately before the Exxon Valdez
disaster, Hazelwood “downed at least five double vodkas” and con-
sumed enough alcohol that “a non-alcoholic would have passed
out.”121  Given the facts of the case, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari “to consider whether maritime law allows corporate liabil-
ity for punitive damages on the basis of the acts of managerial
agents . . . .”122  This issue wholly embodied the precise point of
disagreement between the circuit courts.
115. Id. at 705 (explaining rationale for adopting new punitive damage stand-
ard).
116. Id. (describing role of employer agent who committed act).
117. CEH, Inc., 70 F.3d at 705 (quoting district court regarding incentive for
increased competence) (internal quotation marks omitted).
118. Id. at 703, 705 (providing no limiting definition for “managerial capac-
ity”).
119. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 482-84 (2008) (delineating
definition and application of ‘agent’ in maritime law).
120. Id. at 476 (describing alcoholic conduct of ship captain).
121. Id. at 477 (recounting captain’s dangerous drinking activities on night of
oil spill) (internal quotation marks omitted).
122. Id. at 481 (granting certiorari to discuss applicable merits of maritime
law).
17
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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Baker according to
the Restatement standard and held Exxon liable for five billion dol-
lars’ of punitive damages.123  Upon reaching the Supreme Court,
an eight-justice panel considered the case, with Justice Alito taking
no part in the decision because of his ownership of Exxon stock.124
After discussion, the Court split evenly over whether maritime law
imposes corporate liability based on the actions of managerial
agents, and chose to leave the Ninth Circuit’s opinion undisturbed
while explicitly noting that “it should go without saying that the
disposition here is not precedential . . . .”125
D. Resolution: The Court should adopt the Restatement
Standard
If (and likely when) the Deepwater Horizon litigation reaches the
Supreme Court, this question is sure to be resolved.126  The district
court in Deepwater Horizon took the rare step of resolving the issue
under each of the circuit’s standards, making separate findings that
the case would come out differently in the First and Ninth Cir-
cuits.127  In deciding this issue, the Supreme Court should 1) not
feel bound by any of the prior precedent and, thus free to decide
the question de novo, and 2) consider normative and policy
arguments.128
1. Legal Arguments for Punitive Damages
The threshold question the Court will confront is: does stare
decisis bind the Court?129  If either The Amiable Nancy or Lake Shore
speaks directly to the question, then the Court, at least in theory,
123. Id. at 484 (recounting procedural history).
124. See Baker, 554 U.S. at 515 (explaining recusal of Justice Alito); see also
Linda Greenhouse, Justices to Hear Exxon’s Challenge to Punitive Damages, NEW YORK
TIMES (Oct. 30, 2007), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/30/business
/30bizcourt.html?pagewanted=print&_r=0 (“[Justice Alito’s] ownership of Exxon
stock caused him to recuse himself from the case”).
125. Baker, 554 U.S. at 484 (stating unprecedented nature of issue).
126. See Eaton, supra note 5 (questioning settlement of punitive damage
issue).
127. In re Oil Spill, 21 F. Supp. 3d 657, 751 (E.D. La., by the Deepwater Horizon
in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123245, at *568-71
(E.D. La., Oct. 12, 2014) (“The State of Alabama urges the Court to make separate
findings, as not all Circuits follow the same rule as the Fifth Circuit and some cases
may ultimately be resolved under the law of other Circuits. The Court will briefly
indulge this request.”) (quoting pleading).
128. Id. (suggesting Supreme Court action for deciding Deep Water Horizon).
129. See generally Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (pondering
role of prior precedent applied to issue at question).
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should be compelled to follow its own precedent.130  To do other-
wise, the Court would have to find the standard unworkable, poorly
reasoned, or inconsistent with subsequent developments of law or
societal mores.131
As noted above, both The Amiable Nancy and Lake Shore are im-
perfect precedent.132 The Amiable Nancy, while superficially setting
forth a clear standard for vicarious punitive liability, does not di-
rectly speak to the issue.133  In that case, the district court did not
award punitive damages, and the Supreme Court stated, “the only
inquiry will be, whether any of the items allowed by the district
court were improperly rejected by the circuit court.”134  The Amiable
Nancy standard, therefore, is mere dictum, and while the case is
often cited as a persuasive authority, it is not binding.135
Next, does Lake Shore bind a court sitting in admiralty?136  The
Supreme Court did not revisit the issue between 1893 (Lake Shore)
and 2008 (Exxon),137 so Lake Shore, if binding, is the final and defini-
tive word on the issue.138 Lake Shore, however, suffers from several
problems.139  First, and most glaringly, Lake Shore is not a maritime
case.140  Even though Lake Shore purported to interpret Amiable
Nancy, a proper maritime case, this does not give it proper authority
over maritime courts, which have a fully distinct body of
precedent.141
130. Id. at 827 (emphasizing importance of following established prece-
dence). “Stare decisis is the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded,
predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on ju-
dicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judi-
cial process.” Id.
131. Id. at 849 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (discussing rationale for abandoning
precedent).
132. See supra notes 80-88, Part III (1) (discussing impact of The Amiable
Nancy and Lake Shore).  See supra notes 112-18, Part III (2)(d) (examining Ninth
and First Circuit rejection of legal precedent).
133. See generally  The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. 546 (1818) (lacking specific
standard for vicarious punitive liability).
134. Michael F. Sturley, Vicarious Liability for Punitive Damages, 70 LA. L. REV.
507, n.225 (quoting The Amiable Nancy at (3 Wheat.) 559).
135. See, e.g., Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 411 (2009)
(citing The Amiable Nancy as persuasive authority); Kolstad v. Am. Dental 527 US
526, 541 (1999) (distinguishing The Amiable Nancy from binding authority).
136. See generally Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101
(1893) (debating application to admiralty law).
137. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. at 471, 482-83 (2008) (failing
to address legal effect on admiralty law regarding punitive damages).
138. Lake Shore, 147 U.S. 101 (debating potential binding effect).
139. Id. (highlighting negative elements of case as effective precedent for ad-
miral law).
140. See id. (hearing claim for unlawful arrest made by railway conductor).
141. See CORNELL LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, supra note 14.
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Second, Lake Shore does not speak to the main point of conten-
tion between the circuits: whether a managerial employee’s acts will
be imputed to his employer even absent authorization or ratifica-
tion.  As the Court in Baker noted, “Lake Shore merely rejected com-
pany liability for the acts of railroad conductors, while saying
nothing about the liability for agents higher up the ladder, like ship
captains.”142
Lastly, Lake Shore is seen as a particularly poor authority, even
to courts sitting outside of admiralty.  The Supreme Court later
called its own decision into question and noted it may have been
improperly restrictive, even for its own time.143  Indeed, most courts
sitting outside of admiralty do not follow the Lake Shore standard.144
Putting it all together, admiralty courts should not follow a stan-
dard that was developed outside of maritime law, and further, has
been rejected by the very courts it might have the authority to bind.
2. Normative Justifications for Allowing Punitive Damages
Freed from the constraints of binding precedent, this issue
would reach the Supreme Court as a case of first impression.145
With the lower courts evenly split and the statutory texts silent, the
Supreme Court would likely consider normative-based policy argu-
ments to resolve the issue.  The general advantages and disadvan-
tages of punitive damages (such as deterrence/over-deterrence,
retributive justice, the multiple punishments problem, Due Process
implications, making the victim truly “whole,” etc.) have been de-
bated ad nauseam and won’t be given further treatment.146  More
interesting to the present inquiry, is how the policy arguments ap-
ply specifically to oil drilling.
Furthermore, given that twenty-two percent of the world’s un-
discovered, technically recoverable resources lie north of the Arctic
142. Baker, 554 U.S. at 484.
143. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456
U.S. 556, 575 n. 14 (1982) (“[T]he Court may have departed from the trend of late
19th–century decisions when it issued Lake Shore . . . .”).
144. See W. Page Keeton et al., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 13 (5th ed. 1984).
145. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining “first impression” as
“A case that presents the court with an issue of law that has not previously been
decided by a controlling legal authority in that jurisdiction.”).
146. The debate has raged since Simon Greenleaf and Theodore Sedgwick
crossed swords in the mid-1800s. Compare SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE (1859) (arguing in support of punitive damages), with THEODORE
SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES (1858) (arguing against puni-
tive damages).
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Circle,147 the Court would be prudent to consider Arctic-specific
arguments in formulating any prospective standard.  The opera-
tional risks in oil and gas development in the Arctic are severe and
amplify one another: remoteness, extreme cold, darkness, and pow-
erful sea ice.148  Most important to the Arctic, the Court should
consider the role that a fully functioning tort system, particularly
punitive damages,149 plays in: 1) filling the gaps in preexisting regu-
latory schemes; and 2) encouraging self-regulation.150
Filling the gaps in the preexisting regulatory scheme is crucial
in the extreme Arctic climate.  As outlined by the Brookings Insti-
tute, the current regulatory framework is not tailored to the condi-
tions of the Arctic marine environment.151  This is, of course,
problematic when coupled with the fact that the Arctic outer conti-
nental shelf (OCS) is dramatically different from any other U.S.
OCS area.152  The differences, climate, remoteness, ice, etc., all ex-
acerbate the chances of an oil spill and worsen their effects.153  In
their report, the Brookings Institute recommends the U.S. govern-
ment rewrite the regulatory framework to encompass these con-
cerns and create Arctic-specific standards.154
147. 90 Billion Barrels of Oil and 1,670 Trillion Cubic Feet of Natural Gas Assessed
in the Arctic, UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY (2008), available at http://
www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=1980#.VJQ53MABA (summarizing assess-
ment of Arctic resources).
148. Arctic Opening: Opportunity and Risk in the High North, LLOYD’S OF LONDON
35 (2012), available at http://www.lloyds.com/~/media/files/news%20and%20in
sight/360%20risk%20insight/arctic_risk_report_webview.pdf; Oil Spill Prevention
and Response in the U.S. Arctic Ocean: Unexamined Risk, Unacceptable Consequences, PEW
ENVIRONMENT GROUP 10-23 (2010), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media
/legacy/uploadedfiles/peg/publications/report/Oil20Spill20Preventionpdf.pdf
(discussing general risks of Arctic exploration).
149. Cf. David Luban, A Flawed Case Against Punitive Damages, 87 GEO. L.J. 359
(Nov. 1998) (demonstrating serious flaws in methodology and reasoning in prior
article calling for discontinuance of punitive damages in environmental cases).
150. Timothy D. Lytton, Using Tort Litigation to Enhance Regulatory Policy Mak-
ing, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1837, 1838 (June 2008) (outlining impact of tort law on pro-
duction of regulation).
151. Charles Ebinger et al., Offshore Oil and Gas Governance in the Arctic: A Lead-
ership Role for the U.S. 34 (Mar. 2014), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/
media/research/files/reports/2014/03/offshore%20oil%20gas%20 governance
%20arctic/offshore%20oil%20and%20gas%20governance%20web.pdf  (stating
Arctic environment not fully considered by regulations governing production).
152. PEW ENV’T GRP., supra note 157, at 5 (discussing unique marine environ-
ment extant in Arctic).
153. Id. (discussing increased risk of spill and increased damage that would
result).
154. Ebinger et al., supra note 161, at 52 (recommending strengthening of
diplomatic efforts).
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In the absence of government movement, the tort system has
the ability fill this void and create common-law standards.  For ex-
ample, given the concerns particular to the region, a court could
define a certain action as reckless in the Arctic which would not
necessarily be considered reckless in other regions.  With extra lia-
bility through civil suits looming, Arctic operators will surely take
additional precautions.
Achieving a high level of self-regulation is also an important
objective in achieving an optimally safe Arctic-drilling environment.
Indeed, one of Brookings’ main recommendations to achieve safer
Arctic drilling was to better integrate the private sector into the reg-
ulatory efforts.155  While perhaps an imperfect analogy, a brief com-
parison of prescriptive and performance-based regulations is
illustrative.  A prescriptive approach (such as what is used in the
United States) sets forth explicit requirements operators must meet
to be in compliance.156  A performance-based approach (such as
that used in Norway), on the other hand, is designed to shift the
responsibility for how to meet certain quantifiable goals to the op-
erator.157  While both regimes have advantages and disadvantages,
performance-based systems have the advantage of encouraging in-
novation instead of mere compliance,158 and thus may be more
effective.159
The threat of additional civil liability has proven an effective
impetus to spark self-regulation in other already highly regulated
sectors, such as the gun industry.160  After additional possible civil
penalties, the gun industry innovated to improve safety, taking such
measures as including trigger locks in gun sales and distributing
educational materials to children about gun safety.161  If a robust
155. Ebinger et al., supra note 161, at 50 (recommending expansion of legal
framework through treaties and Arctic specific regulation).
156. Ebinger et al., supra note 161, at 22 (discussing prescriptive approach).
157. Id. at 23 (using Norway as example to discuss meaningful ways perform-
ance-based approach has been successful).
158. See generally Gaia J. Larsen, Skewed Incentives: How Offshore Drilling Policies
Fail to Induce Innovation to Reduce Social and Environmental Costs, 31 STAN. ENVTL. L.J.
139 (June 2012) (discussing advantages of performance based systems).
159. See Cary Coglianese et al., Performance-Based Regulation: Prospects and Limi-
tations in Health, Safety and Environmental Protection 20 (2002), available at http://
www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/Events/Papers/RPPREPORT3.pdf.  “Expanding the
use of performance-based regulation holds promise for achieving health, safety,
and environmental goals at lower cost and for doing so in a way that accommo-
dates if not encourages technological innovation.” Id.
160. Lytton, supra note 159, at 1847 (comparing use of civil liability as form of
regulation).
161. Id. (discussing regulation through civil liability in terms of firearms
manufacturers).
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tort system can similarly encourage Arctic operators to self regulate
and innovate, then the United States may reap the benefits of a
performance-based system, even with the prescriptive framework in
place.
3. Corporate Recklessness—A Novel Approach
Perhaps a court could award punitive damages regardless of
whether The Amiable Nancy standard or Restatement standard
prevails.  Looking to even the most restrictive, The Amiable Nancy
standard (as adopted by the Fifth and Sixth Circuits), a corporation
is liable for punitive damages if it “authorized or ratified the (tor-
tious) acts.”162  Punitive damages, of course, are not available in
every civil suit, but are limited to cases where the defendant’s con-
duct is “owing to gross negligence, willful, wanton and reckless in-
difference to the rights of others, or behavior even more
deplorable.”163  Thus, if a corporation authorizes or ratifies an ac-
tion that meets this level of conduct, it can be found liable for puni-
tive damages.
Gross negligence and willful, wanton, and reckless indifference
(hereinafter, collectively referred to as “recklessness”) are different
from intentional misconduct.164  While a reckless act is volitional, it
is not intended to cause the resulting harm.165  Rather, it is suffi-
cient that the actor realizes, or should realize, there is a strong
probability harm may result, even though he intends, or even ex-
pects, his conduct will prove harmless.166  ‘Strong probability’ is a
lesser standard than ‘substantial certainty,’ the standard required to
show intentionality, and a more stringent standard than negligence
requires.167
It is rare to thoroughly understand, ex ante, the probable out-
comes of certain actions.  An individual does not know when switch-
ing lanes on the highway or affixing a ladder to a roof the precise
odds of causing an accident.  As such, case law defining and com-
paring recklessness to negligence and intentionality is qualitative,
162. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fuhrman, 407 F.2d 1143, 1148 (6th Cir. 1969) (hold-
ing punitive damages were given in error).
163. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 493 (2008) (internal cita-
tions omitted) (holding lower court properly vacated punitive damages).
164. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500(f) (1965) (discussing distinction
between misfeasance and malfeasance).
165. Id. (discussing recklessness).
166. Id. (discussing likelihood of harm necessary to create recklessness).
167. Id. at § 500(f)-(g) (discussing grades).
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not quantitative.  For example, a reckless action is strongly proba-
ble, rather than, for example, sixty-to-eighty percent probable.
Shell and other actors preparing to drill in the arctic, however,
are in the rare position of being able to understand the odds of
incident prior to acting—and those odds have been pegged at sev-
enty-five percent by the BOEM Environmental Impact State-
ment.168  Is seventy-five percent substantially certain, thus meeting
the bar for intentionality?  Likely not.
But is seventy-five percent strongly probable, and thus reckless?
Channeling a textualist ethos, the Merriam Webster dictionary de-
fines ‘strongly probable’ as an event with a well-established chance
of occurring.169  Under this inquiry, a seventy-five-percent likeli-
hood seems to meet the definition of strongly probable.  However,
this exercise is not particularly instructive (query whether ‘well-es-
tablished chance of occurring’ is in any way inherently more mean-
ingful than ‘strongly probable’) and would quickly lead to a spell of
circular reasoning.
Perhaps most illuminating, would be comparing these odds to
familiar, everyday events.  For example, an almost-two-touchdown
favorite in college football has about a seventy-five percent chance
of winning the game outright.170  As an avid college football fan, I
can certainly say that when my team is favored by two touchdowns, I
am confident that there is a ‘strong probability’ of victory.171  Dif-
ferent analogies may prove more meaningful to different people
based on life experience, but whatever that analog may be, I believe
most individuals would equate seventy-five percent with a strong
probability of occurrence.  This leaves us with a fairly simple and
uncontroversial string of premises to connect:
—Drilling in the Arctic will produce a major oil spill seventy-
five percent of the time.
168. BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., supra note 3.
169. See Strong Definition, Merriam Webster, http://www.merriam-webster.com
/dictionary/strong (last visited Feb. 17, 2015); see also Probability Definition, MER-
RIAM WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/probability (last vis-
ited Feb. 17, 2015).
170. Jeff Zimmerman, Chances of a Football Team Winning Knowing the Vegas
Spread, SB NATION (Aug. 29, 2009), available at http://www.beyondthebox
score.com/2009/8/29/1003957/chance-of-a-football-team-winning (describing
calculation of odds in college football).
171. But see, e.g., Notre Dame v. Northwestern (NBC television broadcast Nov. 15,
2014) (demonstrating my unwarranted confidence in a futile football program los-
ing as 17.5 favorites); Notre Dame v. Navy (NBC television broadcast Nov. 7, 2009)
(crushing my spirit losing when favored by 13 points); Notre Dame v. Syracuse (NBC
television broadcast Nov. 22, 2008).  “We can’t even win when we’re favored by 18
points—at home—against a 2-8 team?”
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—An event with a seventy-five percent chance of occurring is
strongly probable.
—Engaging in an activity that is strongly probable to cause sig-
nificant harm to others is reckless.
—Reckless behavior can be punished by punitive damages.
Quod erat demonstrandum?  Unless there are latent, convoluting sub-
premises, it seems fairly straightforward an oil spill in the Arctic
may lead to the award of punitive damages, even under the strictest
standard for vicarious punitive liability.
IV. CONCLUSION
Shell looks poised to finally roll that four-sided dice during the
summer of 2015 with, if the BOEM study is correct, a three-out-of-
four chance that an oil spill will occur.  In that seventy-five percent
likelihood, the above analysis demonstrates that Shell and other
Arctic operators can and should be found liable for punitive dam-
ages under maritime law.
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